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 "Agriculture has become agribusiness after all.  So the creatures that have been under
our "stewardship" the longest, that have been codified by habit for our use, that have
always suffered a special place in our regard -- the farm animals -- have never been as
cruelly kept or confined or slaughtered in such numbers in all of human history. .... The
factory farm today is a crowded  stinking bedlam, filled with suffering animals that are
quite literally insane, sprayed with pesticides and fattened on a diet of growth stimulants,
anti-biotics, and drugs.Two hundred and fifty thousand laying hens are confined within a
single building. (The high mortality rate caused by overcrowding is economically
acceptable ; nothing is more worthless than an individual chicken"). (Williams 1997).
1: Ecological Animalism versus Ontological Veganism
Many  thinking people have come to believe that there is something profoundly wrong in
commodity culture’s  relationship to living things. That something  is expressed perhaps
most obviously  in the factory farms that profit from distorting and  instrumentalising
animal lives. In numerous  books and articles I  have argued that these abuses are enabled
and justified by a dominant human-centred ideology of mastery over an inferior sphere of
animals and nature.i It is this ideology that is expressed in  economies  that treat
commodity animals reductively as less than they are, as  a mere human resource, little
more than living meat or egg production units.
People aiming to clarify and deepen their experience of contemporary abuse of animals
and nature  face an important set of choices in philosophical theory. In particular, they
have to choose whether to opt for theories of animal ethics and ontology that emphasise
discontinuity and  set human life apart from animals and ecology, or theories  that
emphasise human continuity with other life forms and situate both human and animal life
within an ethically and ecologically conceived universe.  I represent this choice in this
paper by comparing two theories that challenge –in quite different ways – the dominant
ideology of mastery. Ontological Veganism is a theory that advocates universal
abstention from all use of animals as the only real alternative to mastery and the leading
means of defending animals against its wrongs. But, I shall argue,  another theory which
also supports animal defense which I shall call Ecological Animalism, more thoroughly
disrupts the ideology of mastery, and is significantly better than Ontological Veganism
for environmental awareness,  for human liberation, and  for animal activism itself.
Ecological Animalism supports and celebrates animals and encourages a dialogical
ethics of sharing and negotiation or partnership between humans and animals, while
undertaking a re-evaluation of human identity that affirms inclusion in animal and
ecological spheres. The theory I shall develop is a context-sensitive semi-vegetarian
position, which advocates great reductions in first-world meat-eating and opposes
reductive and disrespectful conceptions and treatments of animals, especially in factory
farming. The dominant human mastery position that is deeply entrenched in western
culture  has constructed a great gulf or dualism between humans and nature, which I call
human/nature dualism. Human/nature dualism conceives humans as inside culture but
‘outside nature’,  and conceives non-humans as outside ethics and culture. The theory I
advocate aims to disrupt this deep historical dualism by resituating humans in ecological
terms at the same time as it  resituates non-humans in ethical and cultural terms. It
affirms an ecological universe of mutual use, and sees humans and animals as mutually
available for respectful use in conditions of equality. Ecological Animalism uses the
philosophical method of contextualising  to allow us to  express our care for both animals
and ecology, and to acknowledge at the same time different cultures in different
ecological contexts,  differing nutritional situations and needs, and multiple forms of
oppression.
The theory I shall recommend rejecting, Ontological Veganism, has numerous problems
for both theory and activism on animal equality and ecology. It ties strategy, philosophy
and personal commitment  tightly to personal veganism,  abstention from  eating and
using animals as a form of individual action. Ontological Veganism   insists that neither
humans or animals should ever be conceived as edible or even as usable, confirming the
treatment of humans as ‘outside nature’ that is part of human/nature dualism,  and
blocking any reconception of animals and humans in fully ecological terms. Because it is
indiscriminate in proscribing all forms of animal use as having the same moral status, it
fails to provide philosophical guidance for animal activism that would prioritise action on
factory farming over less abusive forms of farming. Its universalism makes it highly
ethnocentric, universalising a privileged ‘consumer’ perspective, ignoring contexts other
than contemporary  western urban ones,  or aiming to treat them as minor,  deviant
‘exceptions’ to what it takes to be the ideal or  norm.  Although it claims  to oppose the
dominant mastery position, it remains  subtly human-centred because it does not fully
challenge human/nature dualism,  but rather attempts to extend  human status and
privilege to a bigger class of ‘semi-humans’ who,  like humans themselves, are conceived
as above the non-conscious sphere and ‘outside nature’,  beyond ecology and beyond use,
especially use in the food chain. In doing so it stays within the system of human/nature
dualism and denial that prevents the dominant culture from  recognising its ecological
embeddedness and places it increasingly at ecological risk.
Human/nature dualism is a western-based cultural formation going back thousands of
years that sees the essentially human as part of a radically separate order of reason,  mind,
or consciousness, set apart from the lower order that comprises the body, the animal  and
the pre-human. Inferior orders of humanity, such as women, slaves and ethnic Others
(‘barbarians’),  partake of this lower sphere to a greater degree, through their supposedly
lesser participation in reason and greater participation in lower ‘animal’ elements such as
embodiment and emotionality. Human/nature dualism conceives the human  as not only
superior to but as different in kind from the non-human, which as a lower sphere exists as
a mere resource for the higher human one. This ideology  has been functional for western
culture in enabling it to exploit nature with less constraint, but it also creates  dangerous
illusions in denying embeddedness in and dependency on nature, which we see in our
denial of human  inclusion in the food web and in our response to the ecological crisis.
Human/nature dualism is a double-sided affair, destroying the bridge between the human
and the non-human from both ends, as it were, for just as the essentially human is
disembodied, disembedded and discontinuous from the rest of nature, so nature and
animals are seen as mindless bodies, excluded from the realms of ethics and culture. Re-
envisaging ourselves as ecologically embodied beings  akin to rather than superior to
other animals is a major challenge for western culture, as is recognising the elements of
mind and culture  present in animals and the non-human world. The double-sided
character of human/nature dualism gives rise to two tasks which must be integrated.
These are the tasks of situating human life in ecological terms and situating non-human
life in ethical terms.  Ecological Animalism takes up both of these tasks, whereas whereas
Ontological Veganism  addresses only the second.
Conventional animalist and conventional ecological theories as they have evolved in the
last four decades have each challenged only one side of this double dualist dynamic,  and
they have each challenged different sides, with the result  that they have developed in
highly conflictual  and incompatible ways. Although each project has a kind of
egalitarianism between the human and nonhuman in mind, their partial analyses place
them on a collision course. The ecology movement has been situating humans as animals,
embodied inside ecological systems of mutual use, of food and energy exchange,  just as
the animal defense movement has been  trying to expand an extension  to animals of the
(dualistic) human privilege of being conceived as outside these systems. Many animal
defense activists seem to  believe that  ecology can be ignored and that talk of the food
web is an invention of hamburger companies, while the ecological side often retains the
human-centred resource view of animals and scientistic  resistance to seeing animals as
individuals with life stories of attachment, struggle and tragedy not unlike our own,
refusing to apply ethical thinking to the nonhuman sphere. As I will show, a more
double-sided understanding of and challenge to human/nature dualism can help us move
on towards a synthesis, a more integrated and less conflictual theory of animals and
ecology, if not yet a unified one.
2: Non-Use or Respectful Use ?
Human/nature dualism constructs a polarised set of alternatives in which the idea that
humans are above embodiment and thus any form of bodily  use is complemented at the
opposite extreme by idea that nonhumans are only bodies and are totally
instrumentalisable, forming a contrast based on radical exclusion. Human/animal
discontinuity is constructed in part by denying overlap and continuity between humans
and animals, especially in relation to food : non-human animals can be our food, but we
can never be their food. Factory farmed animals are conceived as reducible to food,
whereas humans are beyond this and can never be food. Domination emerges in the
pattern of usage in which humans are  users who can never themselves be used, and
which constructs commodity animals in highly reductionist terms.
Although, by definition,  all ecologically  embodied beings exist as food for some other
beings, the human supremacist culture of the west makes a strong effort to deny human
ecological embodiment by denying  that we humans can be positioned in the food chain
in the same way as other animals. Predators of humans have been execrated and largely
eliminated. This denial that we ourselves are food for others is reflected in many aspects
of our death and burial practices -- the strong coffin, conventionally buried well below
the level of soil fauna activity, and the slab over the grave to prevent anything digging us
up, keeps the western human body (at least sufficiently affluent ones)  from becoming
food for other species. Sanctity is interpreted as guarding ourselves jealously and keeping
ourselves apart, refusing even to conceptualise ourselves as edible, and resisting giving
something  back,  even to the  worms and the land that nurtured us. Horror movies and
stories reflect this deep-seated dread of becoming food for other forms of life : horror is
the wormy corpse, vampires sucking blood and  sci-fi monsters trying to eat humans
("Alien 1 and 2"). Horror and outrage usually greet stories of other species eating live or
dead humans, and various levels of hysteria our nibbling by leeches, sandflies,  and
mosquitoes.
Upon death the human essence is seen as departing for a disembodied, non-earthly
realm, rather than nurturing those earth others who have nurtured us. This concept of
human identity  positions humans outside and above the food web, not as part of the feast
in a chain of reciprocity but as external manipulators and masters separate from  it. Death
becomes a site for apartness, domination and individual salvation,  rather than for sharing
and for nurturing a community of life. Being food for other animals shakes our image of
human mastery. As eaters of others who can  never ourselves be eaten in turn by them or
even conceive ourselves in edible terms, we take, but do not give, justifying this one way
arrangement by the traditional western view of human rights to use earth others as
validated by an order of rational meritocracy in which humans emerge on top. Humans
are not even to be conceptualised as edible, not only by other humans, but by other
species.
But humans are food, food for sharks, lions, tigers, bears and crocodiles, food for crows,
snakes, vultures, pigs, rats and goannas, and for a huge variety of smaller creatures and
microorganisms. An Ecological Animalism would acknowledge this and affirm principles
emphasising human-animal mutuality, equality and reciprocity in the food web ; all living
creatures are food, and also much more than food. In a good human life we must gain our
food in such a way as to acknowledge our kinship with those whom we make our food,
which does not forget the more than food that every one of us is, and which position us
reciprocally as food for others. This kind of account does not need to erect a moral
dualism or rigid hierarchy to decide which beings are beneath moral consideration and
are thus available to be  ontologised as edible, and does not  need to treat non-animal life
as lesser. Its stance of respect and gratitude  provides a strong basis for opposing factory
farming and for minimising  the use of sensitive beings for food.
A more egalitarian  vision of ecological embodiment as involving not apartness but
mutual and respectful use has been articulated by many ecological thinkers and
indigenous philosophies. Thus Francis Cook, elaborating the ecological philosophy of
Hua-Yen Buddhism, writes “I depend upon [other] things in a number of ways, one of
which is to use them for my own benefit. For I could not exist for a day if I could not use
them. Therefore, in a world in which I must destroy and consume in order to continue to
exist, I must use what is necessary with gratitude and respect…. I must be prepared to
accept that I am made for the use of the other no less than it is made for my use … that
this is the tiger’s world as well as mine, and I am for the use of hungry tigers as much as
carrots are for my use”.ii A corollary of accepting that one is for the use of the other  is
willingness to share one’s region with predators of humans and to support the restoration
to their original range of the many endangered species of large animals human
dominance is eliminating from the face of the earth.
Ontological Veganism’s treatment of use and instrumentalism could hardly be a greater
contrast ; it extends vegetarianism, prohibiting animal use as food, to veganism,
prohibiting any kind of use. For Ontological Vegans all the problems of animal reduction,
of denial of animal communicativity,  individuality and basic needs in factory farming
stem from a simple cause -- ontologising them as edible.  It is a curious and paradoxical
feature of Ontological Veganism that it basically  shares the taboo on envisaging the
human  in edible terms, and that its strategy for greater equality is the extensionist one of
attempting to extend this taboo to a wider class of beings. The paradox is that it was
precisely in order to give expression to such a radical separation between  humans and
other animals that the taboo on conceiving humans as edible  was developed in the first
place.
Carol Adams in various books and articles (1990; 1993; 1994) provides a very useful and
thorough account of the commodity concept of meat as a reductionist form and of
associated food concepts and practices as sites of domination.iii However, Adams goes on
to present the reductions and degradations of  animals she describes so convincingly as
the outcome of ontologising them as edible (Adams 1993 p 103). But saying that seeing
earth others as edible is responsible for their degraded treatment as "meat" is much like
saying that ontologising human others as sexual beings is responsible for rape or  sexual
abuse. Ontologising others as sexual beings is not correctly identified as the salient
condition for rape or sexual abuse ; rather it is the identification of sexuality with
domination. Similarly, it is the identification of food practices with human domination
and mastery that underlies the abusive use of food animals. The complete exclusion of
use denies ecological embodiment and the important alternative of respectful use.
Thus Carol Adams argues that any use of the animal other (for food or anything else)
involves instrumentalising them (1993, 200), stating that “the ontologising of animals as
edible bodies creates them as instruments of human beings” (1994, 103). Instrumentalism
is widely recognised (although often unclearly conceptualised) as a feature of oppressive
conceptual frameworks, but  instrumentalism is misdefined by Adams as involving any
making use of the other, rather than reductive treatment of the other as no more than
something of use, a means to an end.iv  This definition of instrumentalism as the same
as use is not a viable way to define instrumentalism even in the human case -- since there
are many cases where we can make use of one another for a variety of purposes without
incurring any damaging  charge of instrumentalism.v  The circus performers who stand
on one another's shoulders to reach the trapeze  are not involved in any oppressively
instrumental practices. Neither is someone who collects animal droppings to improve a
vegetable garden. In both cases the other is used, but is also seen as more than something
to be used, and hence not  treated instrumentally. Rather instrumentalism has to be
understood as involving a reductionist conception in which the other is subject to
disrespectful or totalising forms of use and defined as no more than a means to some set
of ends.
3: Discontinuity, Culture and Nature : Demonising and Exceptionalising Predation
By affirming that  we ourselves are subject to use and that all uses of others must involve
respect for individual  and species life, an Ecological Animalism can  affirm continuity of
life-forms, including humans. An Ontological Veganism that occludes the possibility of
respectful  use and treats food as degraded, must assume that only things that are not
morally considerable can be eaten. It is then tied to an exclusionary imperative, requiring
a cut-off  point  to delineate a class beneath ethical consideration,  on pain of having
nothing left to eat. Such positions retain the  radical discontinuity of Cartesian dualism,
repositioning the boundary of ethical consideration at a different point (higher animals
possessing ‘consciousness’), but still insisting on an outsider class of sensitive living
creatures virtually reduced to machine status and conceived as ‘beyond ethics’. It  is a
paradox that, although it claims to to increase our sensitivity and ethical responsiveness
to the extended class of almost-humans, such a position  also serves to reduce our
sensitivity to the vast majority of living organisms which remain in the excluded class
beyond consideration.
Ontological Veganism’s  subtle endorsement of human/nature dualism and discontinuity
also emerges in its treatment of predation and its account of the nature/culture
relationship. Predation is often demonised as bringing unnecessary pain and suffering to
an otherwise peaceful vegan world of female gathering, and in the human case is seen as
an instrumental  male practice of domination directed at animals and women. But if
instrumentalism is not the same as simply making use of something, and even less
thinking of making use of it (ontologising it as edible), predation is not necessarily an
instrumental practice, especially if it finds effective ways to recognise that the other is
more than "meat".Ecologically, predation is presented as an unfortunate exception and
animals, like women, as always victims : fewer than 20% of animals, Adams tells us, are
predators, (Adams 1993, 200) – a claim that again draws on a strong discontinuity
between plants and animals. In this way it is suggested that predation is unnatural and
fundamentally eliminable. But percentage tallies of carnivorous  species are no guide to
the importance of predation in an ecosystem or its potential eliminability.
An Ecological Animalist could say that it is not predation as such that is the problem but
what certain social systems make of predation. Thus I would agree that hunting is a
harmful,  unnecessary  and highly gendered practice within some social contexts, but
reject any general demonisation of hunting or predation, which  would raise serious
problems about indigenous cultures and about flow-on from humans to animals. Any
attempt to condemn predation in general, ontological  terms will inevitably rub off onto
predatory animals (including both carnivorous and omnivorous animals), and any attempt
to separate predation completely from human identity will also serve to reinforce once
again the western tradition's hyperseparation of  our nature from that of animals,  and its
treatment of indigenous cultures as animal-like.  This is another paradox, since it is one
of the aims of the vegan theory to affirm our kinship and solidarity with animals, but here
its demonisation of predation has the opposite effect, of implying that the world would be
a better place without predatory animals. Ontological Vegans hope to avoid this paradox,
but  their attempts to do so, I shall argue, are unsuccessful and  reveal  clearly that their
worldview rests on a dualistic  account of human identity.
 The main move Ontological Vegans make to minimise the significance of predation and
block the problematic transfer of their anti-predation stance from humans to animals is to
argue  that human predation is situated in culture while animal predation is situated  in
nature. (Adams 1993, 206;  Moriarty and Woods 1997). Human participation in predation
therefore cannot be justified as participation in integral natural process, as philosophers
like Holmes Rolston have justified it. Against  simple naturalism,  Moriarty and Woods
argue that (p 399) "meat eating and hunting are cultural activities, not natural activities".
They claim that (p398)  "our distinctively human evolutionary achievement  -- culture--
has strongly separated us from nonhuman nature.  We have found freedom from
ecosystems ... [and] are no longer a part of ecosystems". (p 401). Because meat-eating is
influenced by culture it can be considered to "involve no participation in the logic and
biology of natural ecosystems" (p401). For Ontological Vegans, human hunting and
meat-eating has an entirely different status from the “instinctual” predatory activity of
nonhuman  animals – so much so that they treat the term “predation” as inadmissible for
the case of human hunting.
There are several further problems and paradoxes here. One paradox is that animal
activists who have stressed our continuity with and  similarity with animals in order to
ground our obligation to extend ethics to them now stress their complete dissimilarity and
membership of a separate order,  as inhabitants of nature not culture,   in order to avoid a
flow-on to animals of demonising predation.  Embracing  the claim that humans "don't
live in nature" in order to block the disquieting and problem-creating parallel between
human hunting and animal predation introduces a cure which is worse than the disease
and which is basically incompatible with any  form of ecological consciousness.  The
claim that humans are not a part of natural ecosystems is on a collision course with most
fundamental point of ecological understanding because it denies the fundamental
ecological insight that human culture is embedded in ecological systems and dependent
on nature. It also denies an important insight  many  students of animals have rightly
stressed-- that culture, learning and choice is not unique to the human and that nonhuman
animals also have culture. In fact Woods and Moriarty's solution rests on a thoroughly
dualistic and hyper-separated understanding of human identity and of  the terms 'nature"
and "culture". In order to attain the desired human-animal separation, nature must be
"pure" nature, "strictly biological",  and culture  conceived as "pure" culture, no longer in
or of nature : an activity is no longer natural if it shows any cultural influence, and culture
is completely disembedded from  nature, "held aloft on a cloud in the air".
Of course Ontological Vegans are right to object to any simple naturalisation of human
hunting and meat-eating. On the kind of account I have given, both the claim that meat
eating is in nature rather than culture and the counter-claim that it is in culture and
therefore not in nature are wrong and are the product of indefensible hyper-separated
ways of conceptualising both these categories that are characteristic of human/nature
dualism. It is only if we employ these hyper-separated senses that the distinction between
nature and culture can be used to  block the flow-on problem that demonising human
predation also demonises animal predation. On the sort of account I have given above,
any form of human eating ( and many forms of nonhuman eating) is situated in both
nature and culture -- in nature as a biologically necessary determinable and in a specific
culture as a determinate form subject to individual and social choice and practice. Food,
like most other human (and many nonhuman activities) is a thoroughly mixed activity,
not one somehow throwing together bits of two separate realms, but one expressing
through the logic of the determinate-determinable relationship one aspect of the "intricate
texture" of the embedment of culture in nature. Both naturalising and culturalising
conceptual schemes are inadequate to deal with the problem, both sides of this debate
deny the way our lives weave together and criss-cross narratives of culture and nature,
and the way our food choices are shaped and constrained both by  our social and by  our
ecological context.
 4: Universalism and ethnocentrism.
Ontological Veganism assumes a universalism  which is ethnocentric and fails to allow
adequately for  cultural diversity and for alternatives to consumer culture. Carol Adams’
work, for example, follows a methodology that universalises a US consumer perspective
and hopes to deal with other cultures as exceptions to the “general” rule. Universalism is
supplemented by an exceptionalist methodology which dispenses excuses for those too
frail to follow its absolute abstentionist prescriptions. Deviations from the norm or ideal
“may occur at rare times”, when justified by necessity (Adams 1994, 103). A
methodology which deals with universal human activities  such as eating in terms of US-
centred cultural assumptions  applicable at most to the privileged 20%,  treating  the bulk
of the world’s people as  “deviations” or exceptions,  is plainly highly ethnocentric.
In addition, Adams strives to assimilate all possible animal food practices to those of
commodity culture in what seems to be  an effort to deny that any cultural difference
involving non-instrumental forms of eating animals can exist. Thus her discussion of the
cultural context of the ‘relational hunt” (a crude attempt to model non-instrumental
indigenous food practices) criticises those who refuse to absolutise the vegan imperative,
declaring that “there is, in general, no need to be eating animals” (1994, 103).” She goes
on to suggest that  eating an animal after a successful hunt, like cannibalism in
emergency situations, is sometimes necessary, but like cannibalism is morally repugnant,
and should properly be marked by disgust.  Clearly  indigenous foraging cultures are
among those that  would fall far short of such an ideal.
Ontological Veganism  is based around a mythical gender anthropology which valorises
western women's  alleged "gathering" roles in contrast to demonic "male" hunting. A
cultural hegemony that falsifies the lives of indigenous men and women underlies the
strong opposition it assumes between “male  hunting”  and “female gathering”,  the
sweeping assumption that "women" do not hunt and that female-led "gathering" societies
were vegetarian or plant-based (Collard 1989 ; Kheel 1993, 1995;  Adams 1994, 105,
107). The assumption is that active, aggressive men hunt large animals in what is
envisaged as a precursor of warfare,  while passive, peaceful  women gather or nurture
plants in a precursor of agriculture. This imaginary schema reads contemporary western
meanings of gender and hunting back in a universal way into other cultures, times and
places, assuming a gendered dualism of foraging activities in which the mixed forms
encountered in many indigenous societies are denied and disappeared. Thus  Adams
urges us to base our alternative ideals not on hunting societies but on “gatherer societies
that demonstrate humans can live well without depending on animals’ bodies as food”.
(1994 , 105). But no such purely vegan “gatherer” societies have ever been recorded!
Adams denies the undeniable evidence from contemporary indigenous women's foraging
practices that they often include far more than collecting plants. Australian Aboriginal
women's gathering contributes as much as 80% of tribal food, but  women’s “gathering”
has always involved killing a large variety of small to medium animals. This is not a
matter of speculation about the past, but of well-confirmed present-day observation and
indigenous  experience.
In assuming that alternatives to animal food are always or “generally” available Adams
universalises a context of consumer choice and availability of alternatives to animal food
which ignores the construction of the lifeways of well-adapted indigenous cultures
around the ecological constraints of their country, which do not therefore represent
inessential features of  ethnic cultures in the way she assumes.vi  The successful human
occupation of many places and ecological situations in the world has required  the use of
at least some of their animals for food and other purposes : the most obvious examples
here are places like the high Arctic regions, where for much of the year few vegetable
resources are available, but other indigenous "gathering-hunting" cultures are similarly
placed -- for example Australian Aboriginal cultures,  whose survival in harsh
environments relies on the finely detailed knowledge and skilful exploitation of a very
wide variety of seasonally available foods of all kinds, essential among which may be
many highly-valued animal foods gathered by women and children.
 This gives rise to another paradox : the superficially sensitive Ontological Vegan can
implicitly assume an insensitive and ecologically destructive economic context. From the
perspective of the “biosphere person” who draws on the whole planet for nutritional
needs defined  in the context of consumer choices in the global market, it is relatively
easy to be a vegan and animal food is an uneccessary evil.   But the lifestyle of the
biosphere person  is, in the main,  destructive and ecologically unaccountable. From the
perspective of the more ecologically accountable “ecosystem person” who must provide
for nutritional needs  from within a small,  localised group of ecosystems, however, it is
very difficult or impossible to be vegan : in the highly constrained choice context of the
ecosystem person some animal-based foods are indispensable to survival. Vegan
approaches to food that rely implicitly upon the global marketplace are thus in conflict
with ecological approaches that stress the importance of ecological accountability and of
local adaptation.
A similarly  ethnocentric and inadequately contextualised methodology is  applied by
Ontological Vegans to the issue of the ecological consequences of animal food.(Adams
1993, 214).  The  cultural hegemony and universalism openly espoused by leading vegan
theorists assimilates all planetary meat-eating practices to those of North American grain-
feeding and its alternatives, and is insensitive to the culturally variable ecological
consequences involved in the use of other animals as food. Animal defence theorists
stress  the ecological and health benefits of eating lower down the food chain. (Robbins
1987, Adams 1993, 214, Waller 1997). These principles may be  a useful general guide,
but they are subject to many local contextual variations that are not recognised by
Ontological Vegans. In some contexts, for instance that of the West Australian wheat
belt, the ecological costs of land degradation (including costs to non-human animals)
associated with grain production are so high that eating free-living,  low-impact grazing
animals like kangaroos must at least sometimes carry much lower animal and ecological
costs than eating  vegetarian grains. A vegan diet derived from this context could be in
conflict with obligations to eat in the least harmful and ecologically costly way. 
Veganism does not necessarily minimise ecological costs and can be in conflict in some
contexts with ecological eating. Yet vegan universalists employ a set of simplistic
arguments which are designed to show that the vegan way must always and everywhere
coincide with the way that is  least costly ecologically. Both  David Waller and Carol
Adams quote as decisive and universally-applicable statistics drawn from the North
American context comparing the ecological costs of meat and grain eating. This
comparison is supposed to show grain is ecologically better and dispose of the problem of
conflict between animal rights and ecological ethics. But these  universalist comparisons
assume that grain production for human use is always virtually free of ecological costs or
costs to animal life (whereas it is in many arid land contexts highly damaging to the land
and to biodiversity). They  ignore the fact that in much of the world animals used for food
are not grain-fed, and that the rangeland  over which they graze is often not suitable for
crop tillage agriculture.
5: Suitability  for Activism
The appeal of Ontological Veganism largely depends on the false contrast it draws
between veganism and commodity culture  traditions of animal reduction and
human/nature dualism, that is between no use at all and ruthless use based on domination
and denial. But this is in effect a choice between alienation and domination. Adams’
ethnocentric ontological veganism succeeds in this false contrast because its conceptual
framework obscures the distinction between meat and animal food, where meat is a
determinate cultural construction in terms of domination, and animal food is a cultural
determinable. Meat is the result of an instrumentalist-reductionist  framework,  but the
concept of animal food allows us the means to resist the reductions and denials of meat
by honouring the edible life form as much more than food, and certainly much more than
meat. If we must all, including humans, be ontologised ecologically as edible, as
participating in the food web as a condition of our embodiment, that does not mean we
must all be ontologised reductively as meat.  Food, unlike the reductive category of meat
that does not recognise that we are all always more than food,  is not a hyperseparated
category and does not have to be a disrespectful category.
This distinction enables Ecological Animalism to stand with Ontological Veganism in
affirming that no being, human or nonhuman, should be ontologised reductively as meat,
and hence in opposing reductive commoditisation of animals. But  unlike Ontological
Veganism it can combine the rejection of commoditisation  with the framework of
ecology and cultural diversity by maintaining that all embodied beings are food and more
than food, that is, with an ecological ontology. A careful  contextualisation of food
practices provides much better guidance for activism than a culturally hegemonic
universalism. Ecological Animalism can provide a strong basis for  opposing the
"rationalised" commodity farming practices that reduce animals to living meat and  are
responsible for the great bulk and intensity of domestic animal misery in the modern
west. It  is of necessity more flexible, less dogmatic and universalist, but can still
vindicate the major activist concerns of the animal defence movement. It would require
us to avoid complicity in contemporary food practices that abuse animals, especially
factory farming, and  can agree there are plenty of good reasons for being a vegetarian in
modern urban contexts where food sources are untraceable or treatment of animals
known to be cruel or reductive. But  for Ecological Animalism, vegetarianism would not
represent any disgust at ‘corpses’ or ontological revulsion against our mutual condition as
food, but rather protest at the unacceptable conditions of animal life and death in
particular societies that reduce animals and commodify their  flesh as ‘meat’, in terms
that  minimise their claims on us and on the earth.
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